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This paper studies the sources of the business cycle in Japan, 1973-90,  focus- 
ing on the role played by money supply shocks. A secondary aim is to get a 
feel for whether the effects of Japanese monetary policy are roughly similar to 
those that would result if  the Bank of Japan were operating under a simple, 
stylized rule or objective function. 
For  my  analysis,  I  use  a  simple  open  economy  aggregate  demand- 
aggregate supply model, estimated on monthly data, January 1973 to August 
1990. The six variables  in  the  model  are output, price,  money  supply, oil 
prices,  foreign (U.S.)  output, and the real yeddollar exchange rate. The re- 
duced form of the model is an unrestricted vector autoregression, and identi- 
fication of the underlying linear simultaneous equations system is achieved in 
part with covariance restrictions of the sort first suggested by Blanchard and 
Watson (1986). 
The model  yields a decomposition  of  movements in  the variables  in the 
system into five underlying  shocks: demand, cost, money supply, oil, and a 
residual foreign shock. It is found that movements in output are mainly attrib- 
utable to demand and foreign shocks, movements in foreign output and the 
real exchange rate to foreign shocks; movements in prices are not driven over- 
whelmingly by any one kind of shock. For no variable apart from growth in 
the money supply itself are monetary shocks a particularly important source 
of variability, a conclusion also reached in some studies of the U.S.  economy 
cited below.  But unlike  such studies,  which typically  find a major role for 
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monetary policy in the recession of  1982 and perhaps elsewhere, I find that 
money supply shocks in Japan do not appear to play an especially prominent 
role in any of the cyclical turning points that have occurred in the sample. 
These findings are obviously consistent with Friedman’s (1985, 27) mone- 
tarist view that the Bank of Japan has aimed above all for “highly stable and 
highly dependable” money growth, putting relatively light weight on the state 
of the economy when determining monetary policy. The findings are also con- 
sistent with what I call the “textbook view” that the monetary authority should 
set the money supply rule by maximizing an objective function that aims at 
stabilizing output and prices  (and, perhaps,  other variables such as the ex- 
change rate or the money supply itself as well); Bryant (1990) and, implicitly, 
Hamada and Hayashi (1985) attribute a sophisticated version of this view to 
the Bank of Japan. The bank’s operating instruments (M2, in the present pa- 
per) will then be set as a time-invariant function of all the variables that influ- 
ence the path of price and output (e.g., Chow  1983, chap. 12). A relatively 
small overall role of monetary shocks (where shocks are surprises in monetary 
policy, i.e.,  deviations of the money supply from the  level specified in the 
rule), with no special prominence for such shocks at cyclical turning points, 
seems consistent with this textbook view. 
I  do not  attempt to distinguish beween these  interpretations  by  formally 
inverting my estimated money growth rule to obtain the weights on money, 
output, and price stability in a policy objective function. This is mainly  be- 
cause some reduced-form  evidence suggests that no simple story will stand 
very close scrutiny: both U.S. and Japanese output growth help predict money 
supply growth, a fact inconsistent with an extreme monetarist view that the 
money supply in Japan is set in total disregard to the state of the economy (not 
a view that Friedman or anyone else has advocated, as far as I know). On the 
other hand, money growth is not predicted by inflation, oil price inflation, or 
changes in the real exchange rate; these three variables all help predict output 
and inflation and thus should influence the path of the money supply as well, 
if indeed the textbook view is correct. 
Instead, I see how well a simple monetarist view characterizes the effects 
(if not the intentions) of  monetary  policy by  simulating the behavior of  the 
economy during 1973-90,  under a counterfactual policy of constant expected 
money growth, keeping all shocks fixed at their estimated values. To my sur- 
prise,  the behavior of output growth and inflation is practically  unchanged. 
(This is not because any and all anticipated monetary policy has vanishingly 
small real effects, as shown by  a simulation under a policy  of  adjusting the 
money supply in response to movements in nominal GNP.) While the simula- 
tions cast no direct light on the intentions  of the Bank of Japan’s monetary 
policy, it does raise the possibility that the efects of the activist component of 
its policy-if  any-were  small. I leave open the question as to whether in fact 
there is a gap between intentions and effects and, if so, why. 
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useful to prevent misinterpretation.  First, I do not calculate standard errors on 
the variance decompositions. Related work  (West  1992) suggests that these 
will be quite large. So it is probably not wise to put too much weight on any 
single point estimate. 
Second, I limit myself to inferences mechanically drawn from the estimates 
of my model. I assume that the Bank of Japan can perfectly control the value 
of  M,,  up to a zero mean and  serially uncorrelated  shock; I  abstract  from 
problems that the bank no doubt faces with data availability, uncertainty about 
the values of  key parameters, serial correlation in shocks, and so on. I do so 
not because I doubt the importance of such problems in practice, but because 
I do not believe that my simplified approach biases my results in an obvious 
way. Nonetheless,  in light of the papers for this volume by Okina, Ueda, and 
Yoshikawa, as well as Hutchison (1986), it obviously would be useful to con- 
sider extensions of the model in which the bank’s operating instrument is in- 
terest rates. 
Third, the model used is essentially a textbook open economy model, with 
unrestricted lags put on the right-hand side of all equations to capture dynam- 
ics. Many of the features of  the Japanese economy that from one or another 
point of view might require special treatment-the  system of wage payments, 
the high savings rates, and so forth-are,  I believe, comfortably subsumed in 
the standard model. See Taylor (1989), for example. Other features, such as 
the credit and interest rate controls that apparently have been operative, espe- 
cially in the early part of the sample (Fukui 1986; Ito 1989; Kosai and Ogino 
1984, chap. 6), perhaps are not as easily subsumed. But the standard model 
still tells a “story  . . . consistent with the data,” to use Blanchard’s  (1989, 
1146) conclusion for a similar model applied to U.S. data. I interpret this as 
suggesting that  it is reasonable in a first effort such as this to abstract from 
such special features, while acknowledging  that  much might be learned by 
modeling such features explicitly. 
Finally,  as is well known, the model is not derived from optimization;  in 
addition here, as in, for example, Blanchard  (1989) but  not Taylor (1989), 
expectations are not explicitly modeled but instead are absorbed in distributed 
lags on past variables. It should be noted first of all that the fact that expecta- 
tions are not explicitly  modeled leads to inefficient but not inconsistent esti- 
mates of parameters, impulse response functions, or variance decompositions 
if, as in Taylor (1989), the “true” structural model is simply a rational expec- 
tations version of the aggregate demand-aggregate  supply model. The advan- 
tage of the present approach is that it does not require detailed specification of 
the variables being forecast. For example, in the aggregate supply curve, is it 
just  next  month’s  price,  as  in  a  monthly  version  of  Lucas  (1973), or  a 
weighted sum of the next twelve months of prices, as in a monthly version of 
Taylor (1989)? On the other hand, the simulations  under alternative money 
supply rules potentially fall prey to the Lucas critique. I discuss this briefly in 
the relevant section of the paper. 164  Kenneth D. West 
More generally, some readers will be skeptical about estimates of an aggre- 
gate demand-aggregate  supply model, with or without rational expectations. 
I hope that  such readers will still find in this paper two results  that will be 
useful to keep in mind in future, and perhaps more highly structured, work. I 
state these now, since in the body of the paper I will assume the validity of the 
model in interpreting the empirical results. 
The first result is that at conventional significance levels the broad measure 
of  money  used  here  (M,)  Granger  causes the real  variables  in  the  model. 
Eichenbaum  and  Singleton  (1986)  and  Christiano  and  Ljungqvist  (1988), 
among others,  suggest that  such a finding  is inconsistent with  a strict real 
business cycle theory. A small amount of  experimentation  suggests that,  in 
possible contrast to U.S.  data (e.g., Eichenbaum and Singleton  1986), this 
finding is robust to the method used to detrend the data.' 
Second, while the technique used to orthogonalize shocks relies on the as- 
sumed model for its validity, one can to a limited extent think of it in terms of 
the atheoretical  approach  exemplified  by  Sims (1980).  In this  context, the 
procedure can be interpreted as putting oil price shocks first, the residual for- 
eign shock last, with demand, cost, and money supply shocks in between (and 
no simple Sims-style statement of the order of these three shocks is possible). 
The fact that oil price shocks nonetheless play a small role and foreign shocks 
a big role in output fluctuations suggests that the results for these two shocks 
may be robust to alternative procedures for orthogonalizing the disturbances. 
Section 6.1 describes the model, section 6.2 the data, section 6.3 the esti- 
mates, section 6.4 the sensitivity of the results to minor changes in specifica- 
tion, and section 6.5 the behavior of the economy under hypothetical alterna- 
tive  money  supply rules.  An  appendix  available  on request contains  some 
additional results omitted from the body of the paper to save space. 
6.1  The Model 
The variables in the model, all of which are in logs, are: 
y, = output (industrial production) 
p, = price level (WPI) 
m,  = money supply (M,  + CD) 
0,  = oil prices (WPI for petroleum and coal) 
yT  = foreign output (U.S. industrial production) 
a, = real exchange rate (yeddollar) 
1. On the other hand, the finding is not robust to the measure of money used. High-powered 
money does not Granger cause any of the three sets of  real variables just listed. I believe that, in 
contrast to the argument Eichenbaum and Singleton (1986)  and Christiano and Ljungqvist (1988), 
the argument in Plosser (1990) would suggest that the overall pattern of  Granger causality is 
therefore consistent with a real business cycle view. 165  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
Let x, = (y,,  p,,  m,,  o,, yT, u,)’ be the (6 x  1) vector of endogenous variables, 
with v, = (vyr,  v,,,,  vm,,  vo,,  vy,,,  va,)‘ the corresponding vector of  reduced-form 
innovations (one-step-ahead prediction errors), v,  = x, - ,-  ,x,. 
Six linear simultaneous equations determine the six endogenous variables 
in x,. On the right-hand side of all six are n lags of each of the six endogenous 
variables. Together with a constant term, this set of lags is denoted by the (6n 




y, = al(m,-p,)  + aza, + a3yr*  +rlz,-,  +u,; 
P, = P,Y, + P2or  + r;z,-, + u,,; 
m, = Y,VY, + Y2VP,  + Y3Va,  + Kz,-, + urn,; 
o, = riz,-  I  + uo,; 
a, = +IV,,,  + +2vp, + +3vmr + hVo, + +5vy*, + LZ,-,  + u,, 
(4) 
(5)  y; =  + 6,v,,, + 63Vm,  + Q,,  + r;..z,_,  + uy*l; 
(6) 
The u’s are mutually and serially uncorrelated disturbances, the T’s are (6n + 
1) x  1 vectors of parameters. 
Equation (1) is an aggregate demand curve, ud,  a demand shock. The de- 
mand curve may be obtained  by  combining IS  and LM curves, substituting 
out for the nominal  interest rate. The dependence of  a standard IS curve on 
the real rate rather than the nominal rate is implicitly allowed, since r,’z,-, 
will absorb any term in expected inflation. 
The term in real balances (m,  -  p,)  in (1) comes from the LM curve, and a, 
> 0. The terms in the real exchange rate a, and foreign output yT  come from 
the IS curve. These terms capture the effect that a, and yT  have on the trade 
balance. If a J-curve is operative, so that depreciation  (increase in a,) has a 
perverse negative effect on the trade balance in the short run, a2  < 0, other- 
wise a2  2  0. In  any case, a3  > 0, since increases in foreign output affect 
exports, and thus the trade balance and aggregate demand, positively. 
Equation (2)  is an aggregate supply curve, u,,  a cost (supply) shock. Both 
PI and  P,  are positive:  quantity  supplied  depends positively  on output  and 
negatively on oil prices. Terms in expected prices or output are absorbed in 
Equation (3) is the money supply rule. I assume that, at the beginning of 
month  t, the  monetary  authority chooses an expected  value for the period t 
money  supply, ,- p,.  The difference between m,  and ,-  Im, (the variable v,,) 
might or might not depend on intramonth  attempts by the Bank of Japan to 
influence the path of  nonmonetary  variables.  Output and price, and perhaps 
the real exchange rate, are present to allow for the possibility of such intra- 
month attempts to target these variables (Bryant 1990). A second reason that 
output and price are present is that the measure of money used in the empirical 
work is a broad  one whose period  f  value cannot be perfectly controlled  at 
rp~zl-l. 166  Kenneth D. West 
time (t - I), but instead will depend on surprises in money demand (veloc- 
ity), even if the bank makes no such intramonth attempts. A second reason 
that the real exchange rate is present is that its value might affect intramonth 
decisions about whether or not to sterilize exchange rate operations, and thus 
affect the value of the money supply. 
The monetary  rule of  course might also depend in part on interest rates. 
Equation (3) allows for this implicitly: use the LM curve to write the nominal 
interest rate in terms of money, output, and prices, and possibly lagged values 
of these and other variables, and then substitute out for the interest rate in the 
monetary rule.2 The resulting disturbance will then depend in part on velocity 
shocks and thus be correlated with the aggregate demand shock ud,.  The esti- 
mation procedure described below will, however, yield a shock to the money 
supply that is uncorrelated with demand shocks by construction. This is inter- 
preted as the component of money supply shocks uncorrelated with velocity 
shocks. Under this interpretation, the estimation procedure is attributing en- 
tirely  to demand shocks a  component shared  by  both  demand and  money 
shocks. 
In related literature (Blanchard and Watson 1986), the money supply rule is 
written in terms of levels rather than surprises (e.g., y,y,  rather than y,v,,). In 
the present setup, the specifications are observationally equivalent: estimates 
of  the parameters in (1)-(6), and the implied variance  decompositions, im- 
pulse response functions, and so on, are the same whether levels or surprises 
are used. I write (3) as a function of surprises in accord with my interpretation 
of  monetary policy  as a rule for setting t-,m,; in simulations below on the 
hypothetical effects of alternative rules over the sample period, I take both the 
y,’s and the v,’s  as structural and invariant to the policy rule. 
Equation (4) says that the period  t oil price  is a predetermined  variable, 
which  in the present  setup means that  its innovation is contemporaneously 
uncorrelated  with  the other innovations  in  the model.  Shapiro and Watson 
(1988) argue that this is reasonable because movements in oil prices are dom- 
inated by a few sharp swings. Note that the oil price being predetermined  is 
perfectly consistent with it being Granger caused by other variables. 
Equations (5) and (6) are vacuous identities, simply stating that the period t 
surprise in each of these variables can be written as a linear combination of 
other surprises, plus  a term orthogonal to these  surprises.  The idea is that 
foreign output, while not modeled explicitly, is determined by a set of equa- 
tions  similar to those  determining Japanese  output.  Since  demand,  cost, 
money, and oil shocks plausibly  are correlated across countries, the period t 
surprise in foreign output will be correlated with all these shocks, as well as 
with any shocks to the exchange rate. The estimation procedure will attribute 
2. If the interest rate targeted by the Bank of Japan is different from that in the LM curve (e.g., 
call rate versus gensaki), one must also use an equation relating the two rates to eliminate interest 
rates from the system. The only reason I have not explicitly used interest rates is to avoid increas- 
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this common element of foreign and Japanese demand shocks, for example, 
to ud,  and similarly for other shocks. The residual u,,,,  is thus the idiosyncratic 
component on foreign cycles after any common components have been  ab- 
sorbed by u,,,,  u~,,  u,,  , and u,,,. 
Similarly, the exchange rate is often thought to be set by  forward-looking 
behavior  of  the  sort generally presumed  to determine asset prices, so, like 
other asset prices, its surprise will depend on the surprises of  all the funda- 
mental variables in the model (e.g., Dornbusch  1976; West 1987). The resid- 
ual component u,,  may thus be interpreted as reflecting  speculative forces or 
variations in risk premiums uncorrelated with the fundamentals variables. 
Once again, an observationally  equivalent  model would  result  if  the sur- 
prises in (5)  and (6) were replaced by levels. The potential effects of alterna- 
tive policies for setting ,-  ,m,, however, will be different in the two specifica- 
tions. As written  above, the reduced  form equations for yf and a, will  not 
change with a change in the rule for setting ,-  ,m,, while those equations would 
change if levels were on the right-hand  side. Since tests on the reduced form 
suggest that these two variables are exogenous in the Granger sense from the 
remaining variables (see below), in practice it probably would not make much 
difference which  specification  is used;  I  use  surprises  rather  than  levels  in 
accord with my a priori view that it is implausible that the sorts of  changes in 
the rule for setting  Im, contemplated below will much affect the coefficients 
in  the  reduced-form stochastic  process  for foreign  output  and the  real  ex- 
change rate. 
In equations (5)  and (6), putting foreign output yf before the real exchange 
rate a, is arbitrary; the variance decompositions reported below simply report 
a contribution  fram “foreign  terms”  that  is the sum of  contributions of  u,,, 
and ua,. 
To solve the model, tentatively replace the surprises in (3)-(6)  with levels 
(e.g., replace vv,  in [3] withy,). Write (1)-(6)  in matrix form as 
(7)  Box, = k + B,x,-, + . . . + B,,X,-~  + u,, 
where B, are 6  X  6 matrices,  k is a 6  x  1 vector of coefficients on constant 
terms, and (u,,,,  uc,,  u,,,  u,,,  u  ,,*,,  u,,)’  is a 6  X  1 vector of  mutually and seri- 
ally uncorrelated  disturbances. Premultiplying  both  sides of (1)-(6) by  Bo-’ 
yields a vector autoregressive reduced form, 
(8)  x,  = B;’k  + B;’B,x,_, + . . . + Bt1Bnx,-.  + B;lu, 
= c  + n,x,-,  + . . . + nnxt-n  + v,, 
where  v, = (v,,,  vp,,  v,,,  v,,,,  v,.,,  vat)’ = Btlu, is  the  6  X  1  vector  of 
reduced-form innovations. Even though surprises rather than levels appear in 
equations (3)-(6),  one can similarly deduce that the reduced form of  (1)-(6) 
follows an n’th-order vector autoregression, with a similar mapping from re- 
duced form to structural disturbances; I omit the algebra for simplicity. 
Given B, and nl,  variance decompositions and impulse response functions 168  Kenneth D. West 
can be calculated in the usual way. rI,  may be obtained by OLS. B, may then 
be obtained from the variance-covariance matrix of v, as follows. This matrix 
has twenty-one distinct elements. These must determine twenty-three param- 
eters:  six variances,  one for each of  the elements of  u,,  and  the  seventeen 
coefficients on contemporaneous variables or surprises in equations (1)-(6). 
Without additional information, the system is not identified. Given the wealth 
of studies on the determinants of the Japanese trade balance, which have pro- 
duced some consensus estimates of  relevant elasticities,  it seems likely to be 
uncontroversial to impose values for a2  and a3,  the instantaneous elasticities 
of aggregate demand with respect to the real exchange rate and foreign output, 
and  so I used these studies to impose such values.  This leaves  twenty-one 
parameters  to be determined from the twenty-one elements of the variance- 
covariance matrix of v,. 
The structure of the system is such that the information in these twenty-one 
elements can be exploited by standard instrumental variables techniques. The 
residual from estimating the oil equation (4) uor = vo,  can be used to instru- 
ment the aggregate demand equation, to obtain 8,.  The aggregate demand and 
oil residuals udr  and u,,  can then be used as instruments in the price equation; 
udr,  ucr,  and u,, can then be used as instruments in the money supply equation; 
udr,  u~,,  u,,,  and  u,,  can  then  be  used  as  instruments  in the  foreign  output 
equation; and the entire set of  structural disturbances can be used in the real 
exchange rate equation. 
6.2  Data 
The data are  monthly,  January  1973 to August  1990, for a total of  212 
observations, with pre-1973 data used for initial lags. The ending point of the 
sample  was  determined by  data availability.  The starting  point  was  deter- 
mined, first, by the evident fact that the Japanese economy has behaved quite 
differently  post-1973 than  pre- 1973 and,  second, by  the  presumption  that 
monetary policy was rather different in the era of  fixed exchange rates than in 
the era of floating exchange rates. The exact date January  1973 was chosen in 
accord with Hamada and Hayashi  (1985,  109), who concluded that January 
1973 is the likeliest date for a one-time shift in monetary policy in the early 
1970s. Results of estimates with two other subsamples, January  1976 to Au- 
gust 1990 and January  1973 to March 1990, are very similar, as noted below. 
Data for both the United States and Japan through mid-1988 were obtained 
from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators  (MEI) as supplied on PC dis- 
kettes by VAR Econometrics, and updated by published sources as indicated 
below.  The ME1 indices  of  Japanese  industrial  production,  seasonally  ad- 
justed, and the WPI for mining  and manufacturing, all  1980 = 100, were 
converted to  1985 = 100, and  together with  seasonally  adjusted  data  on 
monthly  averages  of  M,  + CD were then  linked with  post-1988 data pub- 
lished in various issues of  the Bank of Japan’s Economic Statistics Monthly. 169  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
(The ME1 series  is  labeled “MI  + Quasimoney,” but  comparison  with  the 
figures  in  Economic  Statistics  Monthly  indicates  that  the  data  are  for 
M,  + CD. The only seasonally adjusted data for M,  + CD in Economic Sta- 
tistics Monthly were for growth  rates rather than  levels,  so I constructed  a 
post-1988 level series using as an initial condition the last available ME1 fig- 
ure.) The ME1 series on the end-of-month  yen/dollar exchange rate was up- 
dated with data kindly supplied by Kunio Okina. 
These measures  of  price  level  and  money  stock  were  chosen  following 
Bryant (1990), who  suggests that  the  WPI is the  most  appropriate  single 
monthly price index, and Ito (1989, 1990) and Suzuki (1985), who suggest 
that  M,  + CD is the  most  appropriate  single measure  of  the money  stock 
from the point of view of monetary targeting. 
The ME1 indices  of  U.S.  industrial  production, seasonally adjusted,  and 
the  WPI,  both  1980 =  100,  were  converted  to  1987 = 100  and 
1982 = 100, respectively,  and then linked with post-1988 data published in 
the Survey of  Current Business and the Federal Reserve Bank of  St. Louis’s 
National Economic Trends. All data were converted to logs, with the real ex- 
change  rate  defined  as  log(yen/dollar) + log(U.S.  WPI) - log(Japanese 
WPI). 
Figure 6.1 has plots of the growth rates (log differences) and log levels of 
the data, with contraction phases of the reference cycle as defined by the Eco- 
nomic Planning Agency noted by shaded areas. Table 6.1 has some basic sta- 
tistics. The negative first autocorrelation  of output growth and the somewhat 
choppy pattern of autocorrelations for money growth and inflation in oil prices 
(rows  1, 3, and 4) are unusual  features of  the data (at least to one used to 
working with U.S: data); the jerky behavior that leads to these patterns can be 
seen in the graphs for these variables in figure 6.1. 
6.3  Empirical Estimates 
6.3.1  Preliminaries 
The empirical  work began  with  tests for unit roots. Standard univariate- 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests suggested that one difference sufficed to induce 
stationarity in each of the variables; a version of the Johansen (1988) test for 
cointegration, extended to include trend as well as constant terms, found, ac- 
cording to p-values kindly supplied by James H. Stock, no evidence of coin- 
tegration. Details on these tests are available upon request. I thus simply dif- 
ferenced  all  variables  before  proceeding  with  the  empirical  work.  For 
example, y, is the growth rate of output. I nonetheless generally refer to y, as 
simply “output,” except where this might cause confusion. Results from spec- 
ifications estimated  in  levels  rather  than  differences  were  quite  similar,  as 
noted below. 
Using  the  differenced  data,  I  estimated  three  different  VARs,  with  six, 60 
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Table 6.1  Basic Statistics 
Autocorrelations 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation  I  2  3  4  5 
(1) y  0.304  1.444  -0.271  0.186  0.262  -.068  0.131 
(2) P  0.274  1.000  0.780  0.596  0.491  0.458  0.423 
(4) 0  0.599  3.090  0.496  0.298  0.417  0.396  0.239 
(5) y*  0.211  0.897  0.510  0.353  0.262  0.157  0.087 
(3) m  0.845  0.410  -0,008  0.294  0.219  0.148  0.110 
(6) u  -0.130  3.367  -0.026  0.009  0.068  0.004  0.007 
Note; The statistics are based on 212 monthly observations from January 1973 to August 1990. 
Variables: y = rate of growth of output (index of industrial production, mining, and manufactur- 
ing, seasonally adjusted,  1985 = 100);  p  = rate of inflation (WPI); m = growth rate of M,  + 
CD, seasonally adjusted; o = rate of inflation in oil prices (WPI for petroleum and coal); y*  = 
rate of growth of U.S. output (index of industrial production, seasonally adjusted, 1987 = 100); 
a = percentage change in real exchange rate (yen/dollar). 
twelve, and twenty-four lags of each right-hand-side variable, plus a constant 
term. All regressions began in January 1973, with the twenty-four-lag regres- 
sion, for example, reaching back to January 1971 for lags to put on the right- 
hand side. Likelihood ratio tests using the degrees of freedom adjustment sug- 
gested by Sims (1980) rejected the null of  six lags in favor of  the alternative 
of twelve (~~(216)  = 274.2, p-value = .003), but did not reject the null of 
twelve  lags  in  favor  of  the  alternative  of  twenty-four  (~~(432)  = 311.4, 
p-value  = 1.00). In addition, both Q-statistics (reported below) and the in- 
dividual autocorrelations of the residuals suggested that a lag length of twelve 
sufficedqto reduce the residuals in each equation to white noise. I thus set the 
lag length to twelve. 
6.3.2  Reduced Form 
The model  suggests that, except  in  special cases, anything that  Granger 
causes money, oil prices, foreign output, and the real exchange rate ought to 
Granger cause output and prices as well (though of course there may be such 
Granger causality to output and prices even in the absence of Granger causal- 
ity  to  the  right-hand-side  endogenous  variables  in  equations  [ I] and  [2]). 
Table 6.2, panel A, presents F-statistics suggesting that this is essentially the 
case: at conventional significance levels, at least one of money, oil prices, and 
foreign output is Granger caused by each of the six variables (rows 3-5),  and, 
indeed, all  six variables Granger cause output (row  l), and  all but  foreign 
output Granger cause prices (row 2). The standard errors for sums of distrib- 
uted  lags reported  in  table 6.2, panel  B, yield compatible  implications for 
when movements in one variable help predict movements in another. 
Note that money Granger causes both output and prices (table 6.2, panel A, 
rows  1 and 2, column 3), suggesting the possibility that monetary policy may 
be used to influence the path of these two variables. If the monetary authority 173  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
Table 6.2  Reduced Form 
A. Granger Causality Tests 
From 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
To  Y  P  m  0  ?'*  a  y.p. m. o  y*, a 
7.202  3.318  2.723  2.352  3.569  2.345  4.206  2.648 
(I)  (0.0001  [O.OOO]  [0.0021  [0.009]  [O.OOO]  [0.009]  [O.OOO]  [O.OOO] 
1.131  5.280  1.926  2.027  0.784  4.019  9.936  2.172 
(2)  p  [0.340]  [O.OOO]  [0.036]  10.0261  [0.666]  [O.OOO]  [O.OOO]  [0.003] 
2.055  0.766  4.221  0.797  0.973  0.624  2.495  0.651 
(3) m  (0.0241  [0.685]  [O.OOO]  [0.653]  [0.477]  [0.819]  [O.OOO]  10.8891 
(4) o  [0.026]  [O.OOO]  [0.0551  [O.OOO]  10.  I1  I]  l0.0561  [O.OOO]  (0.019l 
0.981  1.704  0.725  1.530  2.596  1.844  1.468  3.049 
(5)  y*  [0.470]  [0.072]  [0.7251  [0.120]  [0.004]  [0.047]  L0.0441  [O.OOO] 
0.792  1.144  0.430  0.679  0.489  1.126  0.729  0.808 
(6) a  (0.6581  [0.330]  (0.9491  [0.769]  [0.918]  (0.3441  (0.8961  [0.722] 
(7)  HA:  m, does not Granger cause y,. m, -  p,. 0,  -  p,. y*,. a, -  xY60) = 92.490 [0.004] 
(8) H,: m, does not Granger cause y,, m, -  p,. u, -  p,, -  ~'(36)  = 80.504 [O.OOO] 
2.022  5.334  1.792  3.236  1.558  1.786  5.856  I ,801 
Left-hand-side 
Variable 
B. Summary Statistics 
Right-hand-side Variables: 
Sums of Lag Coefficients 
Summary Statistics 
(7) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  Standard  (8)  (9) 
Y  P  m  0  Y*  a  Error  Rz  Q (42) 
(1) ?'  -0.695. 
(2)  p  0.218 
(0.183) 
(3)  m  -0.297 
(0.121) 
(4) 0  0.378 
(0.660) 
(0.238) 
(I.  194) 
(0.348) 
(5) )'*  -  0.029 
(6) a  0.573 
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-  0.697 
-  0.143 
-0.412 
1.173 
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(I  ,066) 
-0.547 
0.176  1.033  .49 
(0.104) 
0.087  0.543  .71 
(0.055) 
0.018  0.359  .23 
(0.036) 
0.589  1.960  .60 
(0.197) 
0.006  0.707  .38 
(0.071) 
(0.357) 













Notes: Panel A: The F-statistics in  rows 1-6  test the null that the coefficients are zero for all lags of the variables 
in a given column, when the variable in a given row is on the left-hand side. p-values are given in brackets. The 
degrees of freedom for the tests in the first six columns are  12,139, in  column 7 are 48.139, and in  column 8 
are 24,139. Panel  B: In  columns  1-6  asymptotic standard errors are in  parentheses. Column 7 presents the 
standard error of the regression. In column 9 the p-value for the Q-statistic is in brackets. 174  Kenneth D. West 
is following a program of targeting or stabilizing output and/or prices, in gen- 
eral it should adjust the money supply in response to whatever variables influ- 
ence the path of those two variables (see, e.g., Chow  1983, chapter 12). In 
light of the results in rows  1 and 2, this means in response to all the variables 
in the system. In a stationary world (one in which the objective function of 
the  monetary  authority  and  parameters  of  the model  are unchanging), this 
would lead to money being Granger caused by all the variables in the system. 
It appears, however, that money is Granger caused only by itself and output 
(row  3, columns  1  and 3). Tests on sums of  distributed  lag coefficients re- 
ported in table 6.2, panel B, find some predictive power in foreign output as 
well. But overall there  is no reduced-form  evidence that  the money  supply 
responds to prices, oil prices, or the real exchange rate. 
One possible reason for the lack of Granger causality is that, while there is 
indeed a stable feedback rule consistent with targeting of output and prices, 
the  sample is too small to accurately  reflect  this fact, a distinct possibility 
given that I am using a profligately parameterized model. But while it would 
not be wise to interpret the lack of Granger causality as sharp evidence against 
the simple textbook model of output and price targeting, it seems equally fool- 
ish  to expect  the  estimates  of  this  model  to  yield  sharp implications  about 
what the price and output targets of the Bank of Japan are, even if one’s priors 
are that such targets are central to the bank’s decision making (e.g., Bryant 
1990). 
Also, the fact that both output and foreign output help predict the money 
supply suggests that the bank does have its eyes on the economy when it de- 
termines the money supply. That this money growth is not exogenous has been 
argued by many, including in particular Hutchison (1986), who uses Granger 
causality tests such as those applied here. Once again, it would be foolish to 
expect  the estimates of  this  model  to yield  a clear  statement  that  the  bank 
follows a money-targeting  rule, even if one’s priors are that this is essentially 
the case. 
One final  note  on the reduced  form: the  evidence  that  money  Granger 
causes real  variables  is quite  strong. Consider rewriting  the system  so that 
money is the only nominal variable, with m,  -  p,  (real balances) and 0,  -  p, 
(real oil prices) joining y,, y:,  and a, as real variables. As reported in rows 7 
and 8 of  table 6.2, panel A, the null that money does not Granger cause any 
of these variables is strongly rejected, as is the null that money does not Gran- 
ger cause the set of domestic variables y,, m,  -  p,, and 0,  -  p,. 
6.3.3  Structural Equations 
Table 6.3, panel A, has estimates of equations (1)-(6).  The coefficients on 
y:  and a, in the aggregate demand equation  were  imposed  rather than esti- 
mated: Noland (1989) estimated a long-run elasticity of Japanese exports with 
respect to foreign output of about  1.4. Since exports are about  10 to 15% of 
GNP, and the short-run effect is presumably less than the long-run, this sug- 175  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
Table 6.3  Structural Estimates 
A. Parameter Estimates’ 
(I)  y, = 0.512 (m, -  p,) - 0.03a, + 20~;  + T,’z,-,  + id, 
(.591) 
(2)  p, = 0.255~~  + 0.0940, + rP‘Z,-]  + i, 
(.047)  (.023) 
(3)  m, =  -0.038v3, - 0.057vP, - O.O17v,,  + T,’z,_, + im, 
(.035)  (.112)  (.051) 
(5)  Y; = 0.065~~,  - o.mP,  - 0.096~,, + 0.002~~,  + rt,fz,-,  + i>,, 
(.060)  (.119)  (.169)  (.032) 
(6)  a,  = 0.268v>,  + 2.412vp, +  1.859v,, - 0.344v0, - 0.021vL.,  + ro’z,-,  + be, 
(.301)  (.590)  (.838)  (.160)  (.428) 
B. Summary Statistics 
Equation  Right-hand-side variables: Sums of  Lag Coefficients  Summary Statistics 
Standard 
Y  P  m  0  y*  U  Error  R2 Q (42) 
(1)  -0.408  -1.524  1.723  0.372  1.109  0.189  1.144  .36 27.64 
(0.491)  (0.481)  (0.729)  (0.184)  (0.391)  (0.122)  [0.96] 
(2)  0.615  0.821  0.476  -0.032  -0.363  -0.013  0.531  .72 28.56 
(0.195)  (0.250)  (0.225)  (0.090)  (0.169)  (0.056)  (0.941 
Nores: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.  The coefficients in equation (1) in panel A  without 
standard errors were imposed rather than estimated. See notes to table 6.2 for additional description. 
= 1.144; 6<  = 0.531; 6, = 0.372; 6,>  = 1.960; 6>.  = 0.706; 6” = 3.484. 
gests an upper bound of  about 0.2 for the  short-run elasticity of aggregate 
demand with  respect to foreign output. Krugman and Obstfeld (1988, 454) 
report that Artus and Knight (1984) found that the six-month elasticity of the 
Japanese  current  account  with  respect  to the  real  exchange rate  was about 
-0.25,  and Noland (1989) found a one-quarter elasticity  of  about -  1 (the 
negative signs being consistent with a J-curve), again suggesting an aggregate 
demand elasticity about  10 to 15% of those figures: hence the  -0.03.  Some 
alternative imposed values for these short-run elasticities led to very similar 
results, as noted below. 
The remaining parameters in table 6.3 were estimated by instrumental var- 
iables, as described above. The three freely estimated parameters in the aggre- 
gate demand and aggregate supply equations are all correctly signed. I do not 
know  of  estimates for Japanese data to which  the estimates can be directly 
compared, but comparison with U.S. studies suggests that they are plausible. 176  Kenneth D. West 
Although the estimate of the instantaneous elasticity of aggregate demand 
with respect to real balances is fairly imprecise, the 0.512 value is bracketed 
by estimates from quarterly U.S. data. On the one hand, the 0.15 quarterly 
figure for the MPS  model  for the  United  States (Blanchard  1989, 1150) is 
somewhat  lower.  On the other hand,  if  one combines the Japanese money 
demand estimates in Hamada and Hayashi (1985, table 4.5; income elasticity 
= 0.2 to 0.5, interest elasticity = -0.01  to -0.02)  with the range of interest 
elasticities of  the  IS  curve found  in U.S.  studies (=  -0.1  to  -0.2;  e.g., 
Friedman  1977), the implied value of the elasticity is about 2-5,  somewhat 
higher than the estimated value of 0.512. 
The estimated price elasticity of supply of about 4 (4 = 1/0.255) is brack- 
eted by the quarterly U.S.  estimates of  0.81 (Blanchard and Watson (1986, 
132)) and  10-12  (Blanchard  1989,  1152). The 0.094 figure on oil prices  is 
consistent with the monthly  estimate in Blanchard  (1987, 68) that a  1% in- 
crease in crude materials prices causes a 0.02% increase in consumer prices. 
The three negative signs on the variables in the money supply equation are 
consistent  with  the possibility that the  intramonth response of  the  Bank of 
Japan to shocks is one of “leaning against the wind’; on the other hand, the 
signs could as well simply reflect factors beyond the control of the authority, 
such as intramonth shocks to the money multiplier.  In  any case, none of the 
three estimates is significantly different from zero, so, in the absence of any a 
priori theoretical bounds on plausible values, it is probably  not advisable to 
read much into the signs or magnitudes of the estimates. 
As noted  above, theory does not restrict the signs or values of the coeffi- 
cients on the foreign output and real exchange rate equations. 
Table 6.3, panel B, has estimates of sums of distributed lag coefficients in 
the aggregate demand and supply equations. (The sums for the other equa- 
tions are exactly as presented in table 6.2, panel B.) Coefficients on contem- 
poraneous  right-hand-side  variables  (e.g.,  m,  in  [l]) are  included  in  these 
sums. By and large, the significance of the sums of these distributed lag co- 
efficients is consistent with the Granger causality tests reported above. 
The long-run  response of  a given  left-hand-side  variable to a permanent 
increase in a given right-hand-side variable can be inferred from the estimates 
in  the  table.  The long-run  elasticity  of  aggregate  demand  with  respect  to 
money  is  about  1.2 (=  1.723/1.408), with  respect  to  prices  about -  1.1 
(= -  1.524/1.408), which is probably consistent with a long-run elasticity of 
aggregate demand with respect to red balances of about 1, a point estimate 
suggested by  Hamada  and Hayashi  (1985,  101). The long-run elasticity of 
aggregate  demand  with  respect  to  the  real  exchange  rate  is  about  0.13 
(=  0.189/1.408), comparable to the figures of  about 0.15 and 0.05 implied 
by Artus and Knight (1984, cited in Krugman and Obstfeld  1988, 484) and 
Noland (1989, 177). The elasticity with respect to foreign output is about 0.8 
(=  1.109/1.408), somewhat higher than  the 0.14 figure implied by  Noland 
(1989). (The stated figures for Artus and Knight and Noland were obtained by 177  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 




multiplying their reported elasticities by 0.10, approximately the share of  im- 
ports or exports in Japanese GNP.) 
The long-run price elasticity of supply is about 0.13 (== [I -  0.821]/[1 + 
Figure 6.2 plots impulse response functions (dynamic multipliers), that is, 
one-to-sixty-month response of the levels of output, prices, and money to de- 
mand,  cost, money,  and oil shocks.  (The responses  to  u~*~  and  ua, are not 
given, since the breakdown of the residual foreign shock into these two com- 
ponents is arbitrary; plots of  responses of oil prices, U.S.  output, and the real 
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exchange rate  are omitted to save  space.) While the responses  are  rather 
choppy, probably  because of the negative  first-order serial correlations  of y, 
and the choppy patterns of autocorrelations of m,  (see table 6.  l), the overall 
patterns  were  as expected: demand  shocks increase output and prices; cost 
shocks increase prices and decrease output; money shocks increase prices and 
output, with the long-run effect on output very close to zero. Demand shocks 
decrease  the  money  supply,  suggesting  countercyclical  stabilization;  cost 
shocks cause fluctuations in the money stock for the first six months, but ul- 
timately  the  stock  increases,  suggesting  accommodation,  at  least  in  the 
long run. 
Table 6.4 has variance  decompositions  for both  growth  rates  and  levels. 
Fluctuations in the growth of output are dominated by aggregate demand dis- 
turbances, and in the level of output by the foreign shock, at least at horizons 
of a year or more. While others have emphasized the role of the foreign sector 
in  output  fluctuations  (e.g., Horiye, Naniwa,  and Ishihara  1987), the esti- 
mated figure for levels strikes me as a little high. In any case, it is not clear to 
me why  foreign  shocks are much  more important  for fluctuations of  levels 
than of growth rates. 
Table 6.4 indicates that  supply disturbances  (u, and uo) account for about 
20-25%  of  output  fluctuations  in  both  growth  and  levels.  The figures  for 
growth rates are quite close to those in West (1992), which used a different 
model  and technique  for identifying  sources  of  fluctuations over a slightly 
shorter sample period. They are also comparable to the U.S. results in levels 
for Blanchard and Watson (1986) (though not those in Blanchard  1989, Gali 
1990, or Shapiro and Watson 1988, all of which constrain supply disturbances 
to dominate output fluctuations in the long run). Money supply shocks do not 
contribute much to the variance of the level or growth of output (about lo%), 
again as in the U.S. studies just cited. It is useful to recall here and in the 
remainder  of  the discussion  of  variance decompositions  that  if  the Bank of 
Japan is targeting interest rates, there will be a common component to demand 
and  money  supply  shocks, and the  estimation  procedure  will  attribute this 
component entirely to demand shocks. Finally, oil price shocks do not appear 
to have been very important for output fluctuations. 
Movements in inflation and prices are roughly equally attributable to sup- 
ply, demand, and money factors (table 6.4); the U.S. studies cited above tend 
to  find demand factors  more  important. The contribution  of  money  supply 
shocks begins  quite  small and increases  gradually over time, as one might 
expect in a sticky price model. 
Most of the variance of the growth and level of the money supply is due to 
money  supply  shocks (table 6.4); U.S. studies tend  to find figures that  are 
slightly smaller (Blanchard and Watson 1986; Gali 1990). Fluctuations in oil 
prices are not dominated by any single shock, at least at long horizons (recall 
that the 100% figure for one month holds by construction). Fluctuations in 
U.S. output and the real exchange rate are dominated by foreign shocks. The 179  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 























































































































































0.6  2.4 
2.8  5.5 
2.8  7.7 
6.4  10.0 
5.9  12.6 
7.6  11.5 
8.0  11.0 
Prices 
9.0  0.6 
9.6  7.5 
9.2  6.9 
10.0  10.9 
8.9  14.2 
8.4  14.8 
8.3  15.6 
Money 
0.0  2.1 
I .3  4.1 
I .4  3.9 
2.7  7.4 
4.4  8.7 
4.9  10.5 
5.3  10.7 
Oil Prices 
100.0  0.0 
93.8  1.6 
79.9  3.5 
54.3  9.6 
43.6  17.8 
39.9  17.4 
38.8  17.7 
U.S.  Output 
0.2  97.8 
0.4  95.0 
0.3  93.6 
3.5  89.2 
4.0  82.3 
4.4  71.0 
4.5  66.6 
87.2  8.1  1.6 
80.3  6.3  3.6 
73.5  4.4  3.1 
54.4  2.2  6.4 
34.5  4.3  12.3 
15.7  15.2  12.8 
14.6  23.2  6.4 
20.6  69.4  0.4 
27.1  59.5  0.7 
32.2  53.8  1.0 
40.2  44.7  2.3 
40.2  37.6  3.2 
27.0  33.3  19.3 
11.6  35.2  40.6 
3.1  0.8  94.1 
2.6  0.5  94.8 
4.2  0.5  92.9 
5.2  0.2  91.2 
9.8  0.2  86.3 
23.5  0.1  72.8 
27.2  0.9  66.8 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
1.1  0.2  0.9 
7.5  2.4  2.1 
19.2  19.7  1.8 
28.3  23.9  2.6 
25.2  25.1  9.2 
14.7  27.3  24.8 
0.2  1.7  0.2 
1.4  2.2  0.4 
1.1  2.2  0.2 
0.9  2.9  0.2 
1.2  1.9  1.5 
4.0  7.4  2.1 
2.5  8.4  8.6 
Real Exchange Rate 
0.7  83.1  4.3  7.3  4.6 
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Table 6.4  (continued) 
Growth Rates  Log Levels 
Months  Ud  u,  u,  u,  u,. + u,  Ud  u,  u,  u,  u,.  + u, 
3  4.8  7.7  5.1  0.8  81.6  3.2  7.9  7.2  0.5  81.3 
6  4.8  8.9  4.7  0.9  80.7  2.5  3.9  7.7  0.7  85.2 
12  5.2  10.5  7.7  1.9  74.7  2.5  5.0  7.0  2.3  83.1 
24  7.3  10.7  10.5  2.1  69.5  5.3  5.3  5.1  2.8  81.6 
60  9.3  10.5  10.8  2.4  67.1  6.2  4.5  4.5  3.2  81.6 
Notes: Standard errors are not available. Computation is described in text. 
result for output  is as in West (1992), but not for the exchange rate, whose 
movements West found to be dominated by cost shocks. 
Money supply shocks, then, do not account for a large share of the variance 
in  any of  the  variables  in  the model, except the  money  supply  itself.  It  is 
nonetheless possible that such shocks are important at cyclical turning points: 
Gali (1990, tables 4, 5),  for example, finds that money supply shocks account 
for less than  15% of the variance of  U.S. output at business cycle horizons, 
but attributes to such shocks the leading role in the 1981-82  recession. Table 
6.5 however, suggests that this is not the case for Japan. 
Table 6.5 computes causes of peak to trough changes in the (log) levels of 
output and prices.'  To read the table, consider row  1. The peak (November 
1973) to trough (March 1975) fall of the index of  industrial was  19.32% in 
this contraction  (column  1). The estimates of  the model  indicate that  as of 
Novembir 1973 the index was predicted to be only  11.71  % lower in March 
1975 (column 2), implying that the index fell 7.62% more than predicted (col- 
umn  3). Of  this forecast error, 45%  (i.e., about -  3.43 of  the -  7.62 that 
appears in column 3) is accounted for by demand shocks, 23% by cost shocks, 
15% by  money  shocks, 5% by  oil  shocks, and  12% by foreign shocks.  In 
columns 4-8,  negative signs mean that the indicated shock was of  the oppo- 
site sign of the forecast error in column 3. 
One contraction involved such a small (in absolute value) forecast error for 
output (row 2, column 3) that the estimates in columns 4-8  are very sensitive 
to small changes in the estimate of column 3. The estimates in rows I, 3, and 
4 are not as sensitive, and the figures in column 6 in these rows indicate that 
money supply shocks have not played a dominant role in movements in output 
over any of the contractions in the sample (and, more generally, contractions 
3. Since the growth rate rather than the level of  output appears to be a coincident indicator in 
Japan, there might be a choice of subperiods that would be more revealing about the effects of 
monetary shocks on the level of output, but I know of no source for cyclical phases in the level of 
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Table 6.5  Percentage Changes during Contractions 
~  ~~  ~  ~ 









-  19.32 
0.60 
1.89 




-  13.95 
Level of  Output 
-11.71  -7.62  45 
1.79  -  1.19  328 
8.82  -6.93  -  11 
7.84  -9.27  27 
Price Level 
24.71  0.25  -547 
5.99  -6.11  98 
1.19  5.62  49 
-  1.19  -  12.76  52 
23  15  5  12 
-24  42  -7  -240 
5  -2  9  99 
12  22  0  39 
1236  -624  -169  204 
15  4  -6  -12 
-21  59  -22  35 
-26  15  -3  62 
Notes: The dates given are the peak and trough of  the four contractions in the sample. Column  I  gives 
the actual percentage  change  in  the variable during that contraction.  Column 2 gives the percentage 
change over that row’s contraction  as forecast at the peak  using  parameters estimated over the whole 
sample. Column 3 gives the difference between columns  1 and 2. Columns 4 to 8 decompose column 3 
into the five uncorrelated  shocks in the model, expressed as a percenttage of  column 3; a minus sign 
means that the shocks had a sign opposite to the entry in column 3. The numbers in columns 4 to 8 may 
not add to 100, due to rounding. 
are not attributable to a single type of ~hock).~  Row 7 does indicate that money 
supply  shocks had  a  substantial  impact  on the  unexpected  component of 
the change in the price  level  in the contraction  of  February  1980 to March 
1982. (I ignore row 5,  again because the figure in column 3 for that row is so 
small that small changes in it lead to large changes in the estimates  in col- 
umns 4-8.) 
I conclude, then, that  money  supply shocks have not played  a dominant 
role in output fluctuations,  either over the sample as a whole or over any of 
the contractions that have occurred in the sample; they have been somewhat 
more prominent in accounting for price and inflation fluctuations. 
6.4  Sensitivity of Results 
In this section, I briefly summarize the results of a set of experiments under- 
taken to see whether the results are sensitive to minor changes in specification. 
The experiments are listed in panel A of table 6.6. Specification A is the one 
used in previous tables and is repeated here solely to facilitate comparison. 
Specifications B and C impose different values for the short-run elasticities of 
aggregate demand with respect to foreign output and the real exchange rate 
(see equation [l]). Specification D imposes a random  walk on the real ex- 
4. The relatively small contribution of oil shocks in row  1 is puzzling. 182  Kenneth D. West 
Table 6.6  Effects of Alternative Specifications 
A. Alternative Specificationsd 
Sample  Levels, 
Period  a2, a3  Trend  Other 
A  1973:1-1990:8 
B  1973:l-1990:8 
D  1973:1-1990:8 
F  1973:l-1990:3 
G  1973:l-1990:s 
I  1973:l-1990:8 
C  1973:1-1990:8 
E  1976:1-1990:8 
H  1973:1-1990:8 
-.03,  .20 
-.20,  .20 
-.03,  .05 
-.03,  .20 
-  .03, .20 
-.03,  .20 
-  .03, .20 
-.03,  .20 










Real exchange rate is random walk 
High-powered money instead of M, 
B. Granger Causalityb 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Y,  P,  m,  HA  HE 
Causality at .05 (.  10) Level to  p-value for 
A-D  y. p.  m. 0,  y*, a  p,  m, 0,  a  y, m  0.004  0.000 
E  y, m, 0,  y*  CV),  a  CV),  m  0.012  0.000 
F  y. p,  m, 0,  y*, a  p,  m, 0,  a  Y,  m  0.003  0.000 
H  y, p,  m, 0,  y*, a  P.  (o),  a  6% m  0.001  0.000 
I  Y,  P, (m),  0,  y*, a  P. (m),  a  CV),  m  0.013  0.001 
G  y,  p.  0,  y*, a  P. (m),  a  m, (0).  y*  0.145  0.218 
C. Variance Decompositions of Levels at Twenty-Four Month Horizon' 
Y,  P,  m, 
Ud 4-  u>*  -+ u,  u<  -+ up,  urn  Ud f  u>*  f  uc, u, f  u,>  ujr,  u,+ u3.  f  u,<  u, f  u,,  4, 
A  69  18  13  46  35  19  26  1  73 
B  66  22  12  60  20  20  23  1  75 
C  69  18  13  46  35  20  27  1  72 
D  70  17  12  45  35  20  28  1  72 
E  69  16  16  55  36  8  35  4  62 
F  67  17  16  49  34  17  33  I  66 
G  69  27  4  65  33  2  53  10  37 
H  56  37  7  51  39  10  41  16  42 
I  66  29  5  55  44  2  40  32  28 
'The  results for specification A, which is the one used in previous tables, are repeated for con- 
venience of comparison. Specifications B and C impose different values of the parameters a2  and 
a3,  which are  defined in equation  (1).  Specification D sets to  zero all the coefficients in the 
reduced-form equation for a,.  Specifications E and F try different sample periods. Specification 
G substitutes high-powered money for M,.  In specifications A-G all variables are in differences; 
in specifications H and I  all variables are in levels, with a trend term in all equations in specifi- 
cation H. 
the first three columns, each variable that Granger causes the indicated variable at the .I0  but 
not .05 level is given in parentheses; the other listed variables Granger cause at the .05 or lower 
level. The last two columns report the results of the hypothesis tests and are defined in rows (7) 
and (8) of table 6.2. 
'Totals  may not add to 100, due to rounding. 183  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
change rate a,, a result consistent with the reduced-form evidence presented 
above.5 Specifications E and F try different sample periods. January  1976 to 
August  1990 was studied because Hamada  and Hayashi (1985)  and Suzuki 
(1985) suggest that the Bank of Japan changed its policy in response to the 
first oil shock; January 1973 to March 1990 was studied to eliminate possible 
effects of the huge fluctuation in money growth from April 1990 to May 1990 
(see  figure  6.1).  Specification  G  substitutes  high-powered  money  for  M,. 
Specification H assumes trend stationarity of all variables, and estimates with 
a trend term and twelve lags of the  levels of  all variables  in all equations. 
Specification  I assumes difference  stationarity  of  all variables,  allowing for 
the possibility of cointegration. In this specification, all equations had thirteen 
lags of all variables; the hypothesis tests were performed on the first twelve 
lags, so that an asymptotic normal distribution could be used in the hypothesis 
tests in panel B (see Sims, Stock, and Watson 1990). 
Some Granger causality tests are summarized in panel B; results for speci- 
fications A-D  are of course identical. With the exception of specification G, 
when high-powered  money was used instead of  M,,  money Granger causes 
real variables (panel B, columns  1, 4, and 5). (In contrast to U.S. data, then, 
this  causality  result  holds  for various  techniques  for  inducing  stationarity 
[Stock and Watson 19891.) The variance decompositions in panel C indicate 
that money supply shocks nonetheless do not seem to account for much of the 
movement in output, although they do account for most of the movement in 
the money supply. 
I conclude that my basic result,  that money  seems to Granger cause real 
variables but nonetheless does not account for much of the movement in out- 
put, is unlikely t6 be very sensitive to minor changes in imposed parameters, 
sample period,  or technique to induce differencing. On the other hand, the 
causality  result  is  sensitive  to the  measure  of  the  money  stock.  As  noted 
above, however, Ito (1989, 1990) and Suzuki (1985) suggest that M,  is a bet- 
ter measure of the money stock from the point of view of monetary targeting. 
6.5  Effects of Alternative Money Supply Rules 
A number of authors have suggested that the Bank of Japan uses its operat- 
ing instruments with its eyes focused on “final” (as distinct from intermediate) 
targets. The targets that have been proposed, at least for the post-OPEC-I era, 
include “control of inflation” above all, along with “avoidance of pronounced 
cyclical  swings in output  and  aggregate demand”  and  targeting  of the  real 
exchange rate and balance of payments (Bryant 1990, 32); “price stability and 
5. The model was estimated by the instrumental variables technique described above; since u, 
is not exactly orthogonal to past data in the sample, slightly different estimates would be obtained 
if  I  had used a different  method of extracting parameter estimates from the variance-covariance 
matrix of the reduced-form residuals. 184  Kenneth D. West 
the maintenance of an adequate level of demand” (Hamada and Hayashi 1985, 
83); “price stability” and “a high and stable exchange rate” (Fukui 1986, 110). 
Bryant (1990, 33-34),  Hamada and Hayashi (1985,  116), and Ito (1989) 
seem to doubt that the bank places much weight on deviations of  any given 
monetary aggregate from its targeted value. On the other hand, Fukui (1986, 
110-1 1) and Suzuki (1985, 9) seem to view the money supply as an interme- 
diate target that gets considerable weight. And Friedman (1985, 27) lauds the 
bank  for  a  “fairly  consistent”  policy  of  keeping  money  growth  “relatively 
steady” (i.e., relative to the United States and Great Britain). 
What does the money supply rule estimated above reveal about such de- 
scriptions?  The reduced-form  and  structural  evidence  presented  so  far  is 
strongly suggestive of neither a simple story of  money  supply targeting nor 
the simple textbook one of straightforward targeting of output and prices (per- 
haps with secondary weight placed on the money supply). I therefore doubt 
the wisdom of attempting to invert the estimated rule, to deduce an underlying 
objective function that maps one-to-one into the seventy-three parameters of 
the rule. Instead, to maintain a focus on simple and easy-to-understand objec- 
tive functions, I simulate the behavior of the economy over the sample period 
under the apparently  counterfactual  assumption of  a simple objective func- 
tion. 
This objective function is consistent with constant expected money growth. 
I assume that the monetary authority can perfectly control ,.,m,  but not m,.  For 
simplicity, I abstract from the Lucas critique. I take as given the set of shocks 
and assume that the estimates of the parameters of equations (1)-(6)  are invar- 
iant to such  a change  in  regime.  (In footnote 7, I briefly  speculate on the 
possible biases from this simplification.) The coefficients in the reduced-form 
equations for y,, p,,  and, of course, m,  will change; those for or,  y*,, and a,  will 
not. The simulated time series process for all six variables of course is differ- 
ent from the actual. 
The objective function corresponding to constant expected money growth 
aims to minimize the variance of  money growth,  since under this set of as- 
sumptions it is easy to see that minimizing the variance of  m,  means setting 
,-,m, to a constant.  This constant was set to the estimated  sample mean of 
money growth. 
Table 6.7 has the sample means and standard deviations for the growth of 
nominal output and for each of the six endogenous variables from the actual 
(columns  1 and 4) and simulated (columns 2 and 5) data, as well as correla- 
tions between the actual and simulated data (column 7); columns 3, 6, and 8 
will be described in a moment. As may be seen in columns  1 and 2,  the sim- 
ulated and actual data have nearly identical means. Perhaps surprisingly, they 
also have very similar standard deviations (columns 4 and 5)6  and, with the 
6.  The standard deviation of the money supply (.291) differs from the value of  B,,, given in table 
6.3  (0.372)  only because the latter was calculated using a degrees of freedom adjustment. 185  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
Table 6.7  Effects of Alternative Money Supply Rules 
Correlation 
Means  Standard Deviations  with Actual 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Rule a  Rule b  Rule c  Rule a  Rule b  Rule c  Rule b  Rule c 
(1)  B  0.304  0.305  0.298  1.444  1.372  1.558  0.964  0.776 
(2) P  0.274  0.279  0.273  1.000  0.962  1.105  0.919  0.713 
(3) m  0.845  0.845  0.842  0.410  0.291  0.569  0.710  0.197 
(4) 0  0.599  0.596  0.594  3.090  3.108  3.590  0.940  0.764 
(5) Y*  0.211  0.210  0.211  0.897  0.939  1.038  0.969  0.841 
(7) y  + p  0.578  0.584  0.571  1.787  1.716  1.922  0.957  0.774 
(6) a  -0.130  -0.136  -0.132  3.367  3.461  3.822  0.979  0.877 
Notes; Money supply rule a is the one actually estimated. Rule b sets expected money growth to 
a constant.  Rule c sets expected money growth according to ,-,m, = pI + A(,_,y, + ,-,p, - 
pJ, where p, = 0.845, p2  = 0.578, and A  = -0.25.  The figures in columns 1 and 4 are simply 
the sample moments from the data. The figures reported in the remaining columns are computed 
from a simulation under the indicated rule. 
predictable exception of the money supply, are very highly correlated (column 
7). Moreover, the actual and simulated data are so close that it is difficult to 
tell one from the other when they are plotted.  See figure 6.3, in which the 
actual data are represented  by the solid line, the simulated by a dashed line; 
when  the  software  that  generated  the graph decided  that  the simulated  and 
actual were too close to be distinguished  by eye (as happens especially for 
output growth), it plotted only a dashed line. 
According to the estimated model, then, whether or not the Bank of Japan 
was concerned above all else with stability of money growth, its policies had 
effects on the economy quite similar to those that would have occurred had the 
bank  followed  a rule of  constant  expected  money growth. To  interpret this 
tentative conclusion, let us begin by considering the possibility that the effects 
of anticipated monetary policy are so small that a wide range of money supply 
rules will lead to qualitatively similar behavior of output and prices. 
Consider, then, performing the same counterfactual  simulation with a dif- 
ferent alternative policy, similar in spirit though very different in detail to one 
proposed by McCallum (1988) for U.S. monetary policy. Let expected money 
growth be determined by 
t-14 = F, + UY, + P, - F2L 
where F~  and k2  are constants, p+2 is a target rate for the growth of  nominal 
output, and A  is a negative parameter.  I set kI  to the sample mean of  money 
growth, IJ.~  to the sample mean of nominal output growth, and A  = -0.25  (a 
value that McCallum [1988] found worked well for the United  States in his 
more sophisticated feedback rule). 
Columns 3, 6, and 8 have the resulting sample means, standard deviations, 186  Kenneth D. West 
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Fig. 6.3  Effects of constant money growth rule 
Note; The apal  data are represented by  a solid line; the simulated data are represented by  a 
dashed line. When the actual and simulated data are too close to distinguish (as happens 
especially for output growth), a dashed line represents both. 
and correlations with the actual data. As may be seen, the means are, once 
again, largely unchanged, but now the standard deviations are slightly and the 
correlations greatly different, not only for money growth but for output, infla- 
tion, and nominal output growth as well. Anticipated monetary policy, then, 
does have effects sufficiently large that the estimates suggest that at least one 
alternative policy would have led to very different beha~ior.~ 
7. Even if rational expectations had been modeled explicitly, as in, for example, Taylor (1989), 
my aggregate demand-aggregate  supply model might well still suggest that a hypothetical switch 
to a constant money growth rule would little change output and price behavior. The expectations 
that are relevant are of future prices and output. That the path of  these variables is essentially 
unchanged under the new  rule, when expectational effects are ignored,  indicates that rational 
forecasts of these variables are similarly unchanged-that  is, if we were to write the forecasts as 
distributed lags on the variables in the model, the coefficients in these distributed lags would not 
change much. This suggests (to me, at least) that a rational expectations version of the model may 
also have  an equilibrium  in which the distributed lag coefficients are not much different. This 
means that the coefficients on lagged variables in equations (1)-(6) will change little, which is 
exactly the assumption required to validate the exercise above. 
Such an  argument does not apply to the second money supply rule, which for well-known 187  An Aggregate Demand-Aggregate  Supply Analysis 
Now,  nothing in table 6.7 calls for the conclusion that the Bank of  Japan 
must  have  been  concentrating solely on  stable money  growth.  Indeed,  a 
simple continuity argument indicates that similar results would obtain if the 
hypothetical  objective  function were one  of  stable money growth together 
with, say, stable prices and output, provided the weight on money growth was 
sufficiently large. And it is possible in principle that an objective function that 
places little or no weight on stability of  money growth but measures output 
and inflation stability in a complicated and sophisticated fashion would lead 
to a monetary rule whose simulated effects are as similar to those of the actual 
rule as are those of the constant expected money growth rule. 
I thus do not interpret the results in table 6.7 and the previous section as 
arguing strongly for Friedman’s (1985) view that, even if the Bank of Japan 
has not followed monetarist doctrine to the letter, it has followed the doctrine 
in spirit. I  interpret these results as raising the intriguing possibility that, in- 
sofar as the bank was pursuing activist stabilization policy, such policy had 
little overall effect on the economy. An interesting question for future research 
is why this seems to be the case. 
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